He said that before arriving in New York, he had consulted with the presidents of Kenya and Eritrea, as well as the Ethiopian prime minister and all the darfur groups. It is therefore convinced that the processes that led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement could serve as a basis for the reorganization of the conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. But first, the parties had to commit to the underlying principles and parameters. On the military and security side, the SPLM could contribute to the security, stabilization and protection of the civilian population in Darfur, at the request of the parties and the international community. There was reason to believe that the 9 January agreement significantly improved the prospects for resolving the conflicts in Darfur and Eastern Sudan. Moreover, the current links between the peace agreement and the prospects for ending the conflict in Darfur — in the sense that the former could harm the latter — were wrong, counterproductive and morally incapable, as they punished both the peoples of South Sudan and Darfur. During the war, as with other activities, the best way was often to amplify success. Three agreements had to be concluded in order to reach a comprehensive peace agreement: one on permanent ceasefire agreements, the other on the implementation of all signed protocols and the agreement on permanent ceasefire agreements to be concluded, and the other on international/regional guarantees. The provisions regarding South Kordofan/Nuba and Blue Nile were different from those of Abyei. The key provisions of the agreement did not directly concern the two states, as the PCA expected them to remain in the North.
The two regions, located on the north-south border, were however hard hit by the war, especially after its resumption in 1983. Local complaints about control of the country have led some parts of the population to side with the south. The PCA therefore recognized that any comprehensive regulation must address the problems of these states. They got a slightly different structure of government, with more detailed provisions on state-local government relations and revenue sharing. The PCA has also established a focal commission in each state to address the territorial disputes that have been at the heart of much of the conflict. Finally, a supervisory commission has been set up in each of the two States to study the effects of the implementation of the CPA and the question has been raised of the need to consult the population of both States, without however specifying how or when. THE PARTIES FURTHER RECOGNISE that the successful implementation of the ABS will provide a model of good governance in Sudan, which will help lay a solid foundation for peacekeeping and make unity attractive, and therefore commit to fully respect the letter and spirit of the CPA in order to ensure lasting peace and security for all; Justice and equality in the Sudan; In the same spirit, he added, The members of the Council have begun to draft a resolution to comprehensively address all aspects of the situation in the Sudan. By that resolution, the Council would define the means to establish a full-fledged United Nations peace support operation to contribute to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The United Nations has closely followed and supported the regional peace initiative under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). M. Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, and other senior officials represented the United Nations at IGAD summit meetings and consulted with regional Governments and organizations supporting the peace process. They also participated in meetings of the IGAD Partners Forum, composed of donor countries and organizations that support the IGAD peace process and help the regional organization improve its capabilities in several areas.
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