Mr. Pratt criticized Mr. Marshall`s report on the grounds that he had not identified, between 1999 and 2004, a foreign company wishing to enter the British LPG market, much less a company discouraged from doing so because of Calor`s network of major distributors. However, I agree with Mr. Johnston`s assertion that such evidence is not a precondition for the application of section 81 to the agreements in question. Marshall explains that the concept of trade covers all cross-border economic activities, including settlement. Calor is owned by a Dutch group and Flogas` parent company is headquartered in the Republic of Ireland. This is an indication of an existing community dimension. It can be concluded that the activities of existing foreign market interests may also be influenced by the way the gb market is structured and, in particular, by the Calor agreements. Mr Marshall added that it was sufficient that the network of major concession agreements and the resulting market silos would have an impact on trade between Member States at large. In paragraph 26, paragraph 26 states that „there is no need for the agreement or practice to have or have an effective impact on trade between Member States. It is sufficient that the agreement or practice is „capable“ of having such an effect“ (paragraph 26). LPG is an internationally marketed product, so distortions in the downstream market supply structure are expected to affect the configuration of trade in upstream markets.
I accept Mr Marshall`s evidence in paragraph 99 of his report that there is potential for interstate entry and trade in the supply and distribution of LpG cylinders in Gb and that this potential is affected by the existence of a national network of agreements such as that between Calor and its main distributors. With respect to the conclusions I have already drawn on the negative effects of major dealer agreements on competition and market entry, and referring to the relevant criteria in the guidelines, I conclude that it was reasonably possible to predict, on the basis of objective factors, that agreements, including intermediaries and defence counsel, , may be direct or indirect, have a real or potential influence on the configuration of trade between Member States. To the extent that Mr Pratt has suggested it and Mr Forrester has argued that such a conclusion cannot or should not be reached in the absence of immediate evidence that a company headquartered in another Member State has been diverted from trade with or in the United Kingdom as a result of these agreements, I object. Although the defence counsel`s case would undoubtedly have been supported by such evidence, the case can be considered by considering the case at the beginning of the agreements, if ex hypothesi could not obtain such evidence. It should be remembered that the test is only more judicial. There is no need to assess the actual impact. On the contrary, it is a question of identifying only issues that are of legitimate importance to the interests of the EU. What matters is the potential for such a harmful effect, and there is no doubt that it is often possible that positive evidence of the nature that departs from the persecutors is difficult or impossible to obtain. If the persecutors` approach were the right one, I think it would risk an inappropriate dilution of section 81.
6.1.1 provide a 24-hour emergency service to deal with all gas or emergency leaks resulting from gas supply under this agreement;  The second reason for rejecting this application concerns the content of the client`s commitment to Calor.